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I. INTRODUCTION
After landing your dream job overseas, your remarkable streak of luck
continues. Your college sweetheart, the one that you have not talked to in fifteen
years—the one that got away—just “friend requested” you on Facebook. Without
hesitation, you accept. Thirty seconds later, a message arrives with an
attachment. You have been served.

J.D. candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2013; B.A.,
Philosophy, B.A., English, Indiana University, Bloomington. I would like to thank Professor Fred Galves for his
invaluable insights. I would also like to thank my friends, without which this would not have been possible.
Finally, I’d like to thank my siblings, Kai, Galen, and Katherine, your inspiration and support have always
gotten me through tough times.
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One U.S. court described service of process abroad as “the most challenging
1
[question] a district court can be called upon to face.” As an emerging trend
2
among some foreign and U.S. courts suggests, under certain circumstances,
service via Facebook may be an additional tool for international litigators to use
abroad. As courts in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom
3
have allowed service of process via Facebook, and as more and more courts in
4
the United States allow service via email, some commentators have pointed out
that the same rationale exists for the use of social media and email to serve
5
process. Indeed, given the proliferation of social media and its prevalence in the

1. Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 458 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
2. See Order for Service by Publication on the Internet, MN No. 27-FA-11-3453 (4th Minn., May 10,
2011) available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/70014426/Mpafe-v-Mpafe-order (Minnesota state court order
allowing service by publication on the Internet via social networking sites) [hereinafter Mpafe Order]; see
Pamela D. Pengelley, Fessing Up to Facebook: Recent Trends in the Use of Social Network Websites for Civil
Litigation, 7 CAN. J. L. TECH. 319 (2008) (describing an unreported decision of an Australian court permitting
service of a default judgment by posting its terms on the defendant’s Facebook “Wall”); see Shaunna Mireau,
Substitutional Service via Facebook in Alberta (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.slaw.ca/2009/09/24/substitutionalservice-via-facebook-in-alberta/ (discussing a Canadian unreported court order allowing substitutional service
via Facebook); Stephanie Francis Ward, Our Pleasure to Serve You, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1 2011, 2:49 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/our_pleasure_to_serve_lawyers_social_networking_sites_notify_d
efendants/ (describing a U.S. district court order in Mpafe case allowing her to serve notice of process to her
husband by any social networking site, including Facebook); Martha Neil, UK’s High Court OKs Serving
Injunction on Anonymous Blogger via Twitter, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 2, 2009, 11:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/uk_high_court_uses_twitter_to_serve_injunction_on_anonymous_blogger/ (describing the
first U.K. case where the court allowed service of injunction via the social network Twitter); John. G.
Browning, Served Without Ever Leaving the Computer, 73 TEX. B.J. 180, 181 (2010) (discussing the first cases
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom which allowed plaintiffs to serve defendants via
social media); Ian Llewellyn, NZ Court Papers Can be Served via Facebook, Judge Rules, NEW ZEALAND
HERALD (Mar. 16, 2009, 2:22 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid
=10561970 (describing the first New Zealand case where a judge approved service via Facebook).
3. Pengelley, supra note 2; Mireau, supra note 2 (discussing a Canadian unreported court order allowing
substitutional service via Facebook); Browning, supra note 2; Llewellyn, supra note 2; see Ward, supra note 2
(stating that “the courts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom embrace electronic legal
notice”).
4. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing service via email in the case where the defendant was “elusive” and “striving to evade service of process”); In re Int’l
Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. 713, 720, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (finding that service of process by facsimile
transmission, e-mail and mail to the last know address provided a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction); but
see Ehrenfeld v. Salim A Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641 (RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,
2005) (disallowing service of process by e-mail where e-mail address was “only used as an informal means of
accepting requests for information”); U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., No. C07–1221RSL,
2007 WL 3012612, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2007) (finding insufficient cause to authorize service by email).
5. See Andriana L. Shultz, Superpoked and Served: Service of Process via Social Media Sites, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1497, 1520 (2009) (discussing that in the U.S. federal courts service by e-mail and service via
social media such as Facebook would both require the same framework and would have to comport with (a) the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (b) due process); see Browning, supra note 2, at 181 (discussing an
Australian court case where the court allowed service by sending a private electronic message, with the legal
documents attached, to the defendants’ Facebook pages after concluding that the Facebook pages in fact
belonged to the defendants and that they would receive a sufficient notice if served in this manner).
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day-to-day lives of people all over the world, service via Facebook has the
potential to fit within the legal framework of the United States’ current
constitutional standard for service of process: “reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
6
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
Nonetheless, effectuating service of process via Facebook for international
defendants, while possible, may be difficult given current constitutional
7
requirements and professional standards. While it may be possible under Federal
8
9
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) and the Hague Convention, due process
10
concerns will only be satisfied under certain narrow factual circumstances.
Sending process via Facebook might pass constitutional muster if, as in the cases
authorizing service via email, (1) a court is reasonably certain the Facebook page
creator and the defendant are one and the same, (2) assurances are made that the
defendant received notice, and (3) traditional methods of service are unworkable
11
due to the fault of the defendant. However, even if these factors are satisfied,
growing ethical and privacy concerns about how and when attorneys and others
obtain information of Facebook users also must be addressed. Under limited
circumstances, using Facebook to serve process might be possible under current
statutory and constitutional standards and may be exercised under a court’s
12
discretion. Given the difficulty of serving process on defendants abroad, courts
13
should begin to use this tool.
Part I of this Comment begins by discussing the statutory requirements of
serving defendants abroad before exploring the evolution of service of process

6. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust & Bank Co, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Shultz, supra note 5,
at 1511, 1523, 1528; see Browning, supra note 2, at 181.
7. See infra Part II.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3) (2006).
9. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.N.T.S. 163.
10. See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (authorizing
alternative method of service when defendant was an online business without a physical location and when email was defendant’s way of doing business and a preferred method of communication); see In re Int’l
Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. 713, 720, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (authorizing service of defendant at his
designated electronic address as his preferred means of communication); see Ehrenfeld v. Salim A Bin
Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641 (RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) (finding that service via
e-mail did not meet the constitutional standard because e-mail in this case was used only for informal requests
of information and was not undisputedly connected to the defendant); see U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v.
Nabtesco Corp., No. C07–1221RSL, 2007 WL 3012612, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2007) (finding insufficient
cause to authorize service by e-mail when “the requirements for due process and respect for international law
outweigh plaintiff’s desire to proceed expeditiously”).
11. See Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1018; In re Int’l Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 721-22; see Browning, supra
note 2, at 181 (discussing an Australian court case where the court allowed service by sending a private
electronic message, with the legal documents attached, to the defendants’ Facebook pages after concluding that
the Facebook pages in fact belonged to the defendants).
12. See infra Part VI.
13. See infra Part VI.
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from early case law, to service by publication, and through to the advent of
electronic service of process. Part II of the Comment explores the continued
expansion of the Internet, the enormous growth of Facebook, and the
implications that this has in the larger historical discussion of the evolution of
service of process. Part II also touches on recent cases in which Facebook has
been used to serve process both domestically and abroad. Part III explores the
factual conditions under which service of process via Facebook may work,
analogizing to the precedent cases for service via email in the United States as
well as case law abroad, while also exploring potential answers to the inherent
problems in effectuating service via Facebook. Part IV deals with the ethical
implications that arise when attempting to solve the difficulties that develop
when attempting to effectuate service via Facebook. Part V discusses
circumstances in which Facebook should be allowed to effectuate service of
process and suggests some ways that attorneys and courts can address these
concerns.
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF SERVICE OF PROCESS
As the ways in which society travels and communicates change, the legal
community in the United States has evolved its understanding of what is
statutorily and constitutionally required when apprising a defendant of an action
14
against them and allowing an opportunity to be heard. This Part explores how
due process jurisprudence has evolved since the drafting of the Constitution and
provides a framework for exploring how using social media to effectuate service
of process may be permissible.

14. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (observing that validity of out-of-state
judgments may be directly questioned and enforcement resisted if due process is violated); see generally Int’l
Shoe v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that the court had personal jurisdiction over appellant due
to their systematic and continuous activities in the state); see generally New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v.
Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that because Iran
intentionally avoided service of process that justice demands a substitute form of service); see generally In re
Int’l Telemedia, 245 B.R. at 717-22 (authorizing service of defendant at his designated electronic address as his
preferred means of communication); see generally Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1017-18 (authorizing alternative
method of service when defendant was an online business without a physical location and when e-mail was
defendant’s way of doing business and preferred method of communication); see generally Williams v. Adver.
Sex LLC., 231 F.R.D. 483, 488 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (ruling that plaintiff’s prior attempts at serving a defendant
gave him direct knowledge of a lawsuit, allowing service of process via international mail and email); see
generally Nanya Tech. Corp. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 06-00025, slip op. at 8 (D. Guam Jan. 26, 2007) (holding that
the Hague Convention does not prohibit serving a Japanese citizen by international mail); see generally Bank
Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, No. C 08-00824 JSW, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008) (holding that
service via email is warranted when plaintiffs prove defendant cannot be served at their physical address or
defendant’s agents refuse service); see generally In re LDK Solar Secs. Litig., No. C 07-05182 WHA, slip op.
at 6 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2008) (declaring that service of defendants who were difficult to locate abroad through
a California subsidiary is constitutional and facially permitted by Rule 4(f)(3)).
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A. Statutory Basis for Allowing Service: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)
and the Hague Convention
Initial statutory hurdles in using Facebook to effectuate service include
meeting the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) (“FRCP
15
4(f)”), serving an individual in a foreign country, and the 1965 Hague
Convention on the Service of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or
16
Commercial Matters (“Hague Convention”). The Federal Rules provide that the
service on defendants abroad may be effected (1) according to the Hague
17
Convention if the defendant is to be served in a signatory country; (2) in
countries not signatories to the Hague Convention as directed by the foreign
country’s law, personally or by mail if not prohibited by the foreign country’s
18
law, or as prescribed by the foreign authority; and finally, (3) when the Hague
Convention is inapplicable or when there is no relevant international law “by
means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the
19
court.”
The Hague Convention, a multi-lateral treaty with sixty-nine signatory
20
countries, provides for internationally agreed-upon methods of transmitting
21
requests for service on defendants.
In dicta in Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “compliance
22
with the [Hague] Convention is required in all cases to which it applies.” Article
10(a) of the Convention allows the sending of judicial documents “by post
channels, directly to persons abroad” so long as there is no objection by the state
23
of destination. While the unamended and currently-in-force 1965 treaty
unsurprisingly makes no mention of service by any electronic means, so long as
24
“post channels” encompasses electronic mediums, the Convention may allow it.
The Hague Convention also provides that service may be made in any manner so
long as the jurisdiction does not object to that particular method of service where

15. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f).
16. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad, supra note 9.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(1).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(2).
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
20. Status Table: Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_
en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=17 (last updated Mar. 31, 2013).
21. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad, supra note 9.
22. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988).
23. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad, supra note 9.
24. See Ronald J. Hedges, et al., Electronic Service at Home and Abroad: Allowing Domestic Electronic
Service of Process in Federal Court, 4 FED. CT. L. REV. 65 (2010) (citing Richard J. Hawkins, Comment,
Dysfunctional Equivalence: The New Approach to Defining “Post Channels” Under the Hague Service
Convention, 55 UCLA L. REV. 205, 224 (2007)).
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the defendant can be found, perhaps making it permissible to serve via
26
Facebook. Finally, if the address of the person being served is unknown, the
Hague Convention does not apply and would not be an impediment to
27
effectuating service via Facebook at all. Thus, Facebook may be a viable means
to provide service abroad, in particular where the defendant has proved especially
elusive and a current address is unavailable.
Only an international agreement barring a court from exercising discretion
would disallow service via Facebook under the broad FRCP 4(f)(3) catch-all
28
provision. Indeed, courts may be more likely to give some latitude as the
evolution of FRCP 4(f)(3) is telling of the flexibility that it was meant to provide
29
30
litigators. The original 1963 law was adopted to “add flexibility by permitting
the court by order to tailor the manner of service to fit the necessities of a
31
particular case.” Later versions of the law allowed service “as directed by order
32
of the court,” maintaining that degree of flexibility. The current law retains the
flexibility of its precursors by disallowing service only when it is “prohibited by
33
international agreement.” Within this history is a tolerance for allowing the
rules to fit modern forms of communication so as not to derail a lawsuit for want
34
of service of process. Thus, so long as the guidelines of the Hague Convention
are followed or are inapplicable and there is not a prohibition, service via
Facebook is likely allowable.
B. The U.S. Constitution
To gain a proper understanding of the historical underpinnings of the notice
requirement, it is necessary to discuss the concept within the context of personal
35
jurisdiction. Under nineteenth century traditional territorial power theory, the
only way to gain personal jurisdiction over a non-consenting nonresident
36
defendant was to personally serve process within the forum state. Thus, the
concepts of personal jurisdiction and service of process were sometimes confused

25. See David P. Stewart & Anna Conley, E-mail Service on Foreign Defendants: Time for an
International Approach? 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1755, 759 (2007).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 761.
29. Id. at 763.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(1)(E) (1963) (repealed 1992).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (see advisory committee’s note, subdivision (i)(1)); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i)(1)(E) (1993)
(repealed 2006).
32. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (see advisory committee’s note, subdivision (f)).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3).
34. See Hedges, supra note 24 (discussing cases that ruled that electronic service of process is acceptable
when defendant evades traditional service or defendant uses email for business purposes).
35. See JAMES WM. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 108.01(2)(c) (3d ed. 1997).
36. Id.
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for one another. This is most readily seen in the U.S. Supreme Court decision
Pennoyer v. Neff, which held that service of process must be effectuated within
the state for in personam actions because presence was required to give validity
38
to the court’s exercise of power. However, as the economy began to expand
nationally and more business was done across state lines, this requirement
39
became impracticable.
To address these concerns, the Court expanded Pennoyer’s narrow concept
of personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington by
employing the modern “minimum contacts” analysis for personal jurisdiction,
allowing for jurisdiction as long as “maintenance of the suit does not offend
40
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” While still relying on a
41
sovereignty theory, the Court applied this standard by looking to whether the
defendant maintained “systematic and continuous” contacts such that the
defendant availed itself of the benefits and privileges of doing business in the
42
forum. The Court also held that serving process on the defendant within the
forum state established the defendant’s presence in the forum and therefore
43
provided sufficient notice of the suit. The Court went further by stating that
“substitute service” is adequate where it “gives reasonable assurance that the
notice will be actual” and that sending notice of the suit by registered mail is
44
“reasonably calculated to apprise” defendant of the suit. Thus, just as
International Shoe expanded Pennoyer’s narrow concept of personal jurisdiction
because prevailing economic and social conditions necessitated it, the scope of
45
service of process was forced to expand with it.
This constitutional expansion of the notice requirement continued when the
Court decided Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust & Bank Co. just five years

37. Id.
38. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
39. Shultz, supra note 5, at 1499-1500; see In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 573, 577-79 (1933) (noting
that “[a] legion of commentators and judges have demonstrated that the mid-nineteenth century territorial nexus
requirement needs modification for end-of-twentieth century litigation. The growing interconnectedness of the
national economy and increased social mobility often have rendered the requirement unworkable in its original
form.”).
40. Int’l Shoe v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. at 579.
41. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17 (Black., J., concurring). Justice Black noted that it was “unthinkable”
that a state could not protect its citizens simply because a defendant having systematic contacts in the state was
located outside its borders. In fact, he regarded it as a deprivation of the state’s own citizens due process rights
because the state would be powerless to protect them from those outside. He concluded: “Nothing could be
more irrational or more designed to defeat the function of our federative system of government.” Some
commentators suggest this strong language has allowed for the jurisprudence to evolve more smoothly into
electronic service. See MOORE, ET AL., supra note 35.
42. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Shultz, supra note 5.
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later. The Court held that it was constitutionally permissible to notify unknown
beneficiaries by publication because that method was reasonably calculated
under all the circumstances “to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
47
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” In this
fashion, the Mullane Court recognized that new avenues of process must be
tested; that is, as long as notice was given, unknown beneficiaries could be
48
served with process via modern forms of publication.
Electronic service was first tested in U.S. federal court in 1980 when a group
of American plaintiffs could not serve process on Iranian defendants due to a
breakdown in diplomacy between the respective party’s countries in New
England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission
49
Co. The district court allowed service of process to be effectuated via Telex, a
now obsolete form of electronic communication, stating:
I am very cognizant of the fact that the procedure which I have ordered
in these cases has little or no precedent in our jurisprudence. Courts,
however, cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology. No
longer do we live in a world where communications are conducted solely
by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam ships. Electronic
communication via satellite can and does provide instantaneous
transmission of notice and information. No longer must process be
mailed to a defendant’s door when he can receive complete notice at an
electronic terminal inside his very office, even when the door is steel and
50
bolted shut.
Recognizing the changing landscape of communication and technology, while
simultaneously touching upon the inherent difficulties that can arise while
attempting to serve process, the court modernized the concept of personal service
51
of process through its recognition of technological advances.
In 2000, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia
authorized the service of process to be effectuated on an international defendant
52
53
via email for the first time. Other federal courts have since followed its lead.

46. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust & Bank Co, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
47. Id. at 314-15, 317.
48. See id.; see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Rio
Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002).
49. New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73,
76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
50. Id. at 76.
51. Id.
52. Barefoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc.), 245 B.R. 713, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
53. See In re LDK Solar Secs. Litig., No. C 07-05182 WHA, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2008); Bank
Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, No. C 08-00824 JSW, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008); Williams v.
Adver. Sex LLC., 231 F.R.D. 483, 488 (N.D. W. Va. 2005); Nanya Tech. Corp. v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 06-00025,
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The federal appellate court in Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink
recognized that under certain factual circumstances, not only was sending an
email reasonably calculated to apprise defendants of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to respond, but also that it could be the method of
54
service most likely to reach a particular defendant. While recognizing the
stature of email in the business world, the court set out that the defendants left no
effective avenue to serve process by traditional means, and, with those two
considerations in mind, it was able to allow alternative service of process by the
55
email address provided on the defendants’ website. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the decision, noting that “when faced with an international e-business scofflaw,
playing hide-and-seek with the federal court, email may be the only means of
56
effecting service of process.”
However, the court also acknowledged the limitations of service of process
57
by email. Specifically, there was no way to confirm receipt of an email
message, controversies could arise about whether a document was actually
received, and, given differences in computer systems as well as the limited use of
electronic signatures, there could be problems with complying with verification
58
requirements found in other sections of the federal rules. These concerns will
have to be addressed if service via Facebook is to be effective. Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit gave discretion to the lower court’s balancing of the limitations of
service by email against the benefits, given the entirety of the circumstances,
noting that the defendants seemed to purposely evade traditional service and
59
made email the only means by which they could be contacted.
Though there has been an expansion toward greater liberalization of service
of process, not all courts have concluded that service by email passes
60
constitutional muster in all circumstances. In Ehrenfeld v. Salim A Bin Mahfouz,
the court refused to authorize email service because the defendant’s email
address was “only used as an informal means . . . [of] business
61
communications.” Similarly, the court in U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v.
Nabtesco Corp. refused to allow service of process via email because the factual
situation was “unlike Rio Properties where the defendant was ‘elusive’ and

slip op. at 8 (D. Guam Jan. 26, 2007).
54. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1018.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing FED R. CIV. PROC. 4(a), 11).
59. Id.
60. Ehrenfeld v. Salim A Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641 (RCC), 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
23, 2005); U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Nabtesco Corp., No. C07–1221RSL, 2007 WL 3012612, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2007).
61. Ehrenfeld, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769 at *3.
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‘striving’ to evade service of process.” Because the limitations outlined in Rio
outweighed the benefits given the facts of each particular case, these courts held
63
that service via email failed to pass constitutional muster. Those seeking to
effectuate service of process via Facebook must keep these considerations in
64
mind as well.
III. THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF THE WEB, THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA, AND TRENDS IN USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO SERVE PROCESS
The courts in Rio and New England Merchants, and Mullane and
International Shoe prior, recognized that as technology advances and the way we
communicate evolves, so too must service of process. International, and now
domestic, decisions allowing service of process to be effectuated via social media
are coming down as the profound growth of the Internet takes root in day-to-day
65
life and the ubiquitous stature of social networking takes hold.
The number of Internet users worldwide has doubled to over two billion
people since the last time the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure underwent
66
substantial changes in 2006. By the end of 2010, thirty percent of the world’s
67
population was online, up from twelve percent in 2003, and six percent in 2000.
However, that expansion has not been uniform throughout the world, leading to
68
what has been dubbed the “digital divide.” While sixty-seven percent of people
in the most developed post-industrial nations had access to the Internet, only 3.4
percent, 15.9 percent, and 24.5 percent of peoples in Sub-Saharan Africa, the
69
Middle East, and Latin America, respectively, had access to the Internet. The
“digital divide” may have implications for how and when defendants in certain
countries may be served via Facebook because there is less of a chance that
defendants will maintain a profile, and thus, Facebook may not be a reasonable
medium to comprise them of the action and allow them the opportunity to
70
respond.

62. U.S. Aviation Underwriters, No. C07–1221RSL, 2007 WL 3012612, at *2.
63. Ehrenfeld, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2005 WL 696769 at *3; U.S. Aviation Underwriters, No. C07–
1221RSL, 2007 WL 3012612, at *2.
64. See Ehrenfeld, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), WL 696769 at *3; U.S. Aviation Underwriters, No. C07–
1221RSL, 2007 WL 3012612, at *2.
65. See supra notes 61-64; see infra notes 66-80.
66. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3 (2011), available at
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/ind/D-IND-ICTOI-2011-SUM-PDF-E.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
67. Id.
68. Amir Hatem Ali, The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New Tools for Closing the
Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 189-90 (2011).
69. Id. at 189.
70. See infra Part II.
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In the United States on the other hand, 75.5 percent of households had
computers in 2010, up from 72.5 percent in 2008, and 71.6 percent of households
71
had Internet access in 2010, up from 63.6 percent in 2008. In addition, the
number of active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants went from
72
26.9 to fifty-four from 2008 to 2010. The sheer numbers of people online, and
the ever-expanding growth in both the way people access the web as well as the
amount of time spent online, make it more likely that service via online mediums
will provide constitutional notice of a pending action.
73
Facebook was launched in 2004 and has seen unprecedented growth. By
74
2006, the site had twelve million users and took over the top spot in unique
visitors of social network sites in one month in 2009 with nearly sixty-nine
75
76
million. By the end of that year it boasted 350 million active users and has
surged since. The site ballooned to more than 800 million active users by the end
77
of 2011, and in October of 2012 the site reached one billion active users.
Eighty-one percent of users reside outside of the United States and the site is
78
available in more than seventy languages. Worldwide, more than 600 million
79
active users access Facebook using a mobile device.
One of the largest emerging trends among Internet users is social
80
networking. Americans spend more time on social networking than any other
81
activity. Facebook.com alone has more traffic than any other website and the
82
site reaches seventy percent of active U.S. Internet users. Social networks and
blog sites account for 22.5 percent of time spent online, more than twice the
83
amount of the second leading category. Nearly four in five active Internet users
84
visit social networks and blogs. Those numbers are mirrored globally in
developed countries: social networks and blogs reach over three in five active

71. INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 66, at 1-3.
72. Id.
73. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2013).
74. Number of Active Users at Facebook Over the Years, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 23, 2012),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/number-active-users-facebook-over-230449748.html.
75. Andy Kazeniac, Social Networks: Facebook Takes Over Top Spot, Twitter Climbs, COMPETE.COM
(Feb. 9, 2009, 2:01 PM), http://blog.compete.com/2009/02/09/facebook-myspace-twitter-social-network/.
76. Number of Active Users at Facebook Over the Years, supra note 74.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 81-86.
81. NIELSON, STATE OF THE MEDIA: SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT (2011), available at http://www.nielsen.
com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2011-Reports/nielsen-social-media-report.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Internet users on average in ten major global markets. As unprecedented growth
continues in both the number of people who access the Internet and spend their
time using social media, courts in the United States and abroad have begun to
recognize that using this medium can provide reasonable notice of a pending
86
action under the right circumstances.
In what is thought to be the first time Facebook was allowed to be used to
serve process in the United States, Minnesota resident Jessica Mpafe wanted a
divorce in May 2011, but she had just one problem: she had not seen her husband
87
in years and did not know how to locate him. She needed to serve him with
divorce papers and the only lead she had was a suspicion he had moved back to
88
the Ivory Coast. She asked the court to allow service by general delivery, but
89
the court believed that would be a waste of resources. In considering notice by
publication in a newspaper, the judge concluded that “nobody, particularly poor
people, is going to look at the legal newspaper to notice that their spouse wants to
90
get divorced.” The judge ordered service by publication on the Internet, by
contact via “[F]acebook, [M]yspace, or other social networking site . . . email . . .
or though information that would appear through an [I]nternet search engine such
91
as Google.” However, not all U.S. courts have agreed that effectuating service
via Facebook is reasonably calculated to apprise a defendant of the pendency of
92
an action and provide them an opportunity to respond. The U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York did not allow service via Facebook for a
domestic defendant because the plaintiff could not set forth facts that could give
the court “a degree of certainty that the Facebook profile its investigator located
93
is in fact maintained by [the defendant].”
While case law in the United States remains uncertain, serving process via
social media has emerged as a trend among international courts. In 2008, an
Australian court was the world’s first to allow service to be effectuated via
94
Facebook in MKM Capital v. Corbo. The decision came down despite a case
earlier in the year that voiced concerns on whether defendants’ profiles on
95
Facebook could be authenticated. The court allowed service of a default
judgment via Facebook after the plaintiff’s attorneys were able to make the

85. Id.
86. See supra notes 81-82.
87. Mpafe Order, supra note 2.
88. Ward, supra note 2.
89. Mpafe Order, supra note 2; Ward, supra note 2.
90. Mpafe Order, supra note 2; Ward, supra note 2.
91. Mpafe Order, supra note 2.
92. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80594 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
93. See id.
94. MKM Capital Pty Ltd. v Corbo & Poyser [2008] ACTCA (Unreported, Master Harper, 12 Dec. 2008)
(Austl.); Browning, supra note 2, at 181.
95. Citigroup Party Ltd. v Weerakoon, [2008] QDC 174, 1 (Austl.); Browning, supra note 2, at 181.
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required showing that enough of the information on the defendants’ public
96
Facebook pages matched the information in their home loan applications. The
court reasoned that doing so would provide sufficient notice to the defendants of
97
the action against them. The defendants proved especially elusive in that case
because they moved and changed jobs and phone numbers, advertising in local
98
newspaper failed, and hiring a private investigator turned up nothing. Like later
cases, the judge seemed to be swayed by the difficulty of serving the defendants
99
in more traditional ways.
100
The following year, a New Zealand court followed suit. While living
abroad in England, the defendant allegedly took $241,000 from his family
101
business’s account. Because his exact whereabouts were unknown, making
service by traditional means more unlikely to reach him, and because the
defendant had a Facebook page and corresponded by email, the plaintiff asked
102
for the approval of a secondary service order via those mediums. The judge
obliged, after being convinced that service by publication in a newspaper could
103
not be effectively targeted, and approved the order. Later in 2009, the U.K.
High Court allowed service of an injunction on an anonymous blogger to be
104
effectuated via Twitter. The injunction sought to put a stop to the blogger, who
105
was impersonating a prominent right-wing blogger and lawyer, Donal Blaney.
Rather than waiting for the California company to take down the account, which
would have allowed for the defendant to continue to use the allegedly defamatory
account in the interim, the plaintiff and his barrister went straight to the High
106
Court. Blaney argued the use of the picture from his blog and actual blog
content went beyond mere parody and was intended to make readers think it was
really him, which, according to Blaney, was a violation of British copyright
107
law. The court agreed, approving the order and noting that the only way the
108
anonymous blogger could be communicated with was via his Twitter account.
Finally, in Knott v. Sutherland, a Canadian court allowed the plaintiffs to
substitutionally serve one of multiple defendants by (1) publishing a notice in the

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
100. Llewellyn, supra note 2.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Neil, supra note 2.
105. Id.
106. Paul Lambeth & Jonathan Coad, Serving the Internet—Nowhere to Hide in Cyberspace from a
Cyber Lawyer, LECTLAW.COM, http://www.lectlaw.com/files/elw07.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
107. Neil, supra note 2.
108. Lambeth & Coad, supra note 106.
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newspaper; (2) sending a copy of the claim to the human resources department
where the defendant formerly worked; and (3) sending notice to the Facebook
109
profile of the defendant. Each of these cases shows that given narrow factual
circumstances where the defendant is striving to avoid traditional means of
service, Facebook can and should be an effective tool to use in effectuating
service of process.
IV. FACING DUE PROCESS: HURDLES TO SERVICE VIA FACEBOOK
Once the initial hurdles of getting past the Hague Convention and the
relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are addressed, the central problems in
effectuating service via social media are similar to those of email—namely,
confirmation of receipt of service and verification of the identity of the account
110
holder. As a threshold matter, it must be proven that the Facebook page
111
actually belongs to the defendant. In other words, to be effective, it must be
shown that the information provided by the creator of the page is such that a
court can be reasonably certain that the defendant and creator are one and the
112
same.
However, because Facebook users create personal pages called “profiles” on
which they post information on any topic, sometimes including highly personal
113
information, this authentication can be achieved circumstantially. Depending
on the amount of information a defendant places on their profile, the possibility
exists that it may be cross-referenced with other information known about the
defendant such as their address, phone number, email address(es), relatives,
friends, and personal history, including attendance at different academic
114
institutions, where they have traveled, and various other significant life events.
This could provide a high level of reliability in terms of showing that the owner
of the Facebook page is actually the defendant and give a court reasonable
certainty that the defendant will be apprised of the proceeding and allow them the
115
opportunity to respond.
Another foundational issue is providing a court with assurance that the
116
defendant retrieved the relevant documents while accessing their account.
117
Users can be contacted in a number of ways on Facebook. Other users may

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Knott v. Sutherland, 2009 Edmonton 0803 02267 (Can. Alta. Q.B.M.).
Shultz, supra note 5, at 1525.
Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1527-28.
Browning, supra note 2.
Shultz, supra note 5; see Browning, supra note 2; How to Post and Share, Facebook Help Center,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/sharing (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
115. See Browning, supra note 2.
116. Shultz, supra note 5.
117. How to Post and Share, supra note 114.
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send personal messages that go to the user’s inbox, much in the form of an email,
118
or, if they are online, in the form of an instant message. Users may attach
documents to email messages in a similar fashion to other web-based email
providers making it possible to serve official court documents in the form of PDF
119
files.
Other ways of contacting Facebook users include posting on their “wall” in
which a message is only visible as outlined in the user’s privacy settings,
commenting on user generated “status updates,” and posting messages on the
120
user’s or others’ pictures. However, some foreign courts have been reluctant to
allow the public posting of service of process on Facebook pages due to privacy
121
concerns. Nearly all activities of Facebook users are time-stamped, making it
possible to show that the defendant performed activities on the site before and
after service was sent, and it is possible to verify when a message was “seen” by
a Facebook user because the sender is notified when the user opens the
122
message. Nonetheless, while it may not always be possible to show a defendant
received actual notice, under the right factual situation, particularly where the
defendant has proved elusive, it may be enough to satisfy due process, similar to
123
Rio, through weighing the relevant considerations.
In reality, however, authentication may be exceedingly difficult as Facebook
124
users have access to a variety of privacy settings. These settings allow users to
control who has access to the information on their pages and the information that
125
is posted by them on others’ pages. A user may grant access to their page with
126
almost no information reaching beyond those they accept as “friends,” or they
may permit nearly all of their information to be accessible to the public through a
127
routine Google search. From 2006 to 2008, the amount of users who used
Facebook’s default privacy settings dropped from sixty-four percent to forty-

118. See The New Messages, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/messages/ (last visited Mar.
31, 2013) (describing Instant Messaging). Instant messages are also automatically archived. Id.
119. Sending a Message, Facebook Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/messages/
sending (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
120. How to Post and Share, supra note 114.
121. MKM Capital Pty Ltd v Corbo & Poyser [2008] ACTCA (Unreported, Master Harper, 12 Dec.
2008) (Austl.); Browning, supra note 2.
122. Sending a Message, supra note 119; Browning, supra note 2.
123. See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002); Browning, supra
note 2.
124. See Privacy, Facebook Help Center, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/445588775451827
(last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
125. See id.
126. See id. Users may also limit the amount and types of information friends can see. Id.
127. Cliff Lampe, et al., Changes in Use and Perception of Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008
ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 721, 721 (2008), available at
http://gatortracks.pbworks.com/f/facebook+changes+in+use.pdf; see also Online Exposure, CONSUMER REP.
MAG., June 2011, at 39, 40, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/2011/
june/electronics-computers/state-of-the-net/online-exposure/index.htm; see Privacy, supra note 124.
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eight percent. The more restrictive the privacy settings the user selects, the
more difficult it will be to gather the necessary information to verify that the
profile is that of the defendant and find a degree of reliability that they received
service of process. That being said, gaining access to a user with restrictive
privacy settings can be resolved by becoming “friends” with the user. If the
129
information can be lawfully accessed, it is more likely that service via
Facebook can be effectuated because a court will be given greater assurance that
the owner of the profile page and the defendant are one and the same.
V. DEALING WITH THE DIFFICULTIES IN THE FACE OF ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
The inherent privacy issues of social media in general, and Facebook
specifically, have created practical problems gaining access to defendant’s
130
information in order to satisfy Due Process. To that end, ethical considerations
will be implicated based on whether the information is public or private
information, and, if they are private, whether it is ethical to gain access through
131
the use of “friending.”
Viewing content that is considered “public” will most likely allow an
attorney to avoid being subject to disciplinary action in jurisdictions whose
ethical rules mirror that of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model
132
Rule(s)”). Courts and state bars addressing the issue have considered accessing
an opposing party’s website acceptable because the attorney is viewing
133
information that is accessible to the general public. However, some courts have
considered friend requests to be “communications among members,” which is
expressly prohibited under Model Rule 4.2. Pursuant to Model Rule 4.2, a lawyer
shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a
134
court order. Another means an opposing attorney may use to gain information
to authenticate the defendant’s Facebook page is through “pretexting,” or the use
of impersonation or fraud to trick another person into releasing personal
135
information.

128.
129.
130.
131.

Lampe, et al., supra note 127, at 726.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V; see generally Adding Friends and Friend Requests, Facebook Help Center,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/friends/requests (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
132. See Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
133. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2005-164 (2005).
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002); e.g., Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
2005-164.
135. Steven C. Bennett, The Ethics of “Pretexting” in a Cyber World, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 271
(2010); N.Y.C. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2010-2 (2010), available at http://www.
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While the Model Rules do not specifically address the use of social media by
counsel to obtain information to be used for litigation purposes by pretextual
means, several state bar ethics opinions suggest that the sections are implicated
136
with regard to information gained from social media sites. For example, the
Model Rules prohibit a lawyer or their agents from making false statements of
137
material fact to a third person. Making contact with a third party in the form of
a friend request may constitute a “false statement” in violation of the Rule
because the sole purpose for doing so is to gain information to use in future
138
litigation, a fact which, in most circumstances, the recipient would be unaware.
In addition, Model Rule 8.4(c) bans conduct by a lawyer that involves
139
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Thus, this Rule may also
prohibit “friending” an adverse party because the practice inherently involves
dishonesty, fraud, or deceit. The strategy may be necessary to gain the required
information to obtain permission from the court to serve via Facebook and the
fact that the defendant is abroad would seemingly make little difference as Model
Rule 8.5(a) provides that lawyers are subject to discipline authority “regardless of
140
where the conduct occurs.” However, some jurisdictions have held that when
deceptive practices are not used, obtaining information through “friending” may
141
be permitted. In the few jurisdictions that allow this, effectuating service of
process via Facebook is much more likely because “friending” will allow access
to the information that will be necessary to authenticate and verify that the
Facebook profile page is actually that of the defendant and allow a court to make
142
the relevant balancing analysis to allow Facebook to be used to serve process.
A. The New York City Approach
The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on
Professional and Judicial Ethics (“New York Committee”) faced the issue of
“friending” head-on in its Formal Opinion 2010-2, Obtaining Evidence from
143
Social Networking Websites. The New York Committee concluded that a

nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2010-opinions/786-obtaining-evidence-from-social-networkingwebsites (discussing lawyers obtaining information from social networking websites); Phila. Bar Assn. Prof’l
Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02 (2009), available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBARead
Only.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf.
136. N.Y.C. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2010-2, supra note 135; Phila. Bar Assn.
Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, supra note 135.
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a), 8.4. These prohibitions against deceptive practices
also apply to a lawyer’s agents and thus would apply to those employed to gain such information.
138. Id. at R. 4.1(a).
139. Id. at R. 8.4.
140. Id. at R. 8.5(a).
141. See infra Part V.B.
142. See infra Part VI.
143. N.Y.C. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2010-2, supra note 135.
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lawyer, either directly or through an agent, may contact an unrepresented person
through a social networking website and request permission to access her web
page to obtain information for use in litigation, without disclosing the reasons for
the request, if that attorney or her agent used her real name and profile to send
144
the “friend request.” The New York Committee noted that “while there are
ethical boundaries to such ‘friending,’ in our view they are not crossed when an
attorney or investigator uses only truthful information to obtain access to a
145
website, subject to compliance with all other ethical requirements.” The New
York Committee suggested that lawyers can and perhaps should seek the
valuable information contained on unrepresented party’s Facebook pages, but,
rather than engage in “trickery,” using truthful information promoted the
expeditious resolution of disputes by opening avenues of information and
146
uncovering relevant facts. However, they noted that there are ethical “pitfalls”
that arise from the informality of communicating over the web because it may be
147
easier to deceive a person over the Internet than in the real world. Thus, even in
jurisdictions that allow “friending” using truthful information, precautions should
be taken so that any communications could not be viewed as deceptive.
The use of “friending” gets more complicated when a party is represented by
counsel. New York Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 requires the prior consent of
148
the party’s lawyer be obtained or the conduct must be authorized by law.
Therefore, a lawyer is permitted to view and access the Facebook page of a
represented party other than his or her client in pending litigation in order to
secure information about that party for use in the lawsuit only if the lawyer does
149
not “friend” the party and only accesses public pages posted by the party.
While it is more likely that the information required to effectuate service via
Facebook could be obtained in jurisdictions that follow this approach because
they have seemingly placed a greater emphasis on judicial economy rather than
on providing strict ethical guidelines for attorneys, “friending” would require the
use of only truthful means and only in the case that the defendant is not
150
represented by counsel. This would make it significantly more difficult to
provide the court with enough information to authenticate that the page was that
of the defendant and with information to verify to a reasonable certainty that the
151
defendant had received noticed and was allowed an opportunity to be heard.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
involved.
150.
151.
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B. The Philadelphia Approach
The Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee
(“Philadelphia Committee”) addressed whether “friending” an adverse party
152
would constitute an ethical violation and came to a contrary result. There, an
inquirer sought guidance on whether he could employ a third person to “friend”
an adverse witness on Facebook to gain access to information without using a
153
false name of a witness he knew to grant access to nearly everyone. If the third
party was granted access, the inquirer proposed that he would then evaluate the
154
information for possible use in the pending litigation. The Philadelphia
Committee disposed of the issue of whether a third party could be employed by
concluding that the lawyer would be responsible for the conduct under Rule 5.3
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct (“PRPC”) because he would
have “ordered” the conduct, or, at the very least, “ratified the specific conduct
155
involved with knowledge,” either of which would violate the rule.
As to the central issue of whether the “friending” would run afoul of PRPC
Rule 8.4, which prohibits dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, or
PRPC 4.1, which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of
material fact to a third person, the Philadelphia Committee reasoned that even if
it was obtained using the true name and account of the third party, the course of
156
conduct would be deceptive.
The committee noted that the planned
communication omitted a highly material fact: that the third party was doing so
only because she wished to obtain information for the purpose of sharing it with a
157
lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness. The only
reason for taking this back channel, rather than asking the witness directly for
158
access, was indicative of the deceit involved. Additionally, the fact that the
witnesses’ information could be readily obtained by others who either could or
could not be deceiving her did not alleviate the inquirer of the ethical
159
responsibility not to engage in the same deception. Because it would be
difficult for an attorney to gather enough information to satisfy due process
concerns unless the party has set limited or no privacy settings, and thus the
information could be considered public, it would likely be difficult to effectuate
service via Facebook in jurisdictions that follow this line of reasoning.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Phila. Bar Assn. Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02 (2009), supra note 135.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Other Approaches
Other jurisdictions make similarly strict interpretations of their ethical
160
rules. The Colorado Supreme Court held that no deception whatsoever is
allowed under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, saying that
“[p]urposeful deception by an attorney licensed in our state is intolerable, even
when undertaken as part of attempting to secure the surrender of a murder
suspect . . . [and] we stand resolute against any suggestion that licensed attorneys
in our state may deceive or lie or misrepresent, regardless of their reasons for
161
doing so.” A greater priority is seemingly placed on the ethics of the profession
and how the profession is viewed publicly, rather than on the efficient resolution
of claims. In these jurisdictions, gaining access to information for use in service
via Facebook may only be allowed in situations in which the defendant has put in
place limited or no privacy settings, or the attorney is completely forthcoming
162
about the reasons for “friending” him or her. If the latter avenue is taken, it
seems unlikely a defendant would “add” the attorney or her agent as a friend.
While the possibility exists for service via Facebook in each jurisdictional
approach, some have considered the ethical implications to be outweighed by
judicial economy, thereby making it easier to for attorneys and their agents to
163
access defendants’ personal Facebook information in preparation for litigation.
V. HOW FACEBOOK COULD BE USED IN FEDERAL COURT FOR SERVING
DEFENDANTS ABROAD
Problems serving elusive defendants abroad have long plagued the federal
court system, and Facebook may be an effective way of providing litigators an
164
avenue to get over the initial hurdle in bringing suit. As the world has grown
smaller and the ways in which we communicate have increased, courts have
165
slowly modernized the concept of service of process. After the relevant
statutory requirements have been met, the constitutional aspects of service, given
the entirety of the circumstances, must be considered. The ubiquitous stature of
Facebook may provide not only a reasonable means of apprising a defendant
abroad of an action against her, but it also may be the most likely avenue to

160. See, e.g., In re Conduct of Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 976 (Or. 2000) (holding that no deception at all is
permissible by a private or a government lawyer, even rejecting proposed carve-outs for government or civil
rights investigations); In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002) (holding that no imminent public harm
exception existed to the ethical principle that a lawyer may not engage in deceptive conduct).
161. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d at 1176, 1182.
162. Phila. Bar Assn. Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02, supra note 135.
163. N.Y.C. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2010-2, supra note 135.
164. See New England Merchants Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F.
Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Mayoral-Amy v. BHI Corp., 180 F.R.D. 456, 458 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
165. See New England Merchants Nat’l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 78.
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achieve service of process. This is particularly true when a current address is
unavailable, and the defendant has taken affirmative steps to elude being served.
Problems outlined by the Rio court in authenticating that the owner of the
166
email account and the defendant are one and the same is in many ways easier
for a Facebook profile because the amount of information provided by users is
167
much greater. Verification can be achieved at multiple levels: photographs,
personal relationships, information about education, and outdated addresses can
all be cross-checked. In addition, because time-stamp software is now currently
168
169
available for Facebook messages, and may be possible for email, a court may
be reasonably certain that the owner of the Facebook page has in fact received
the relevant documents based upon whether their message was “seen,” as well as
their other time-stamped activities: responses to messages, status update posts,
170
and comments made on friends’ posts. Due Process would be satisfied because
it would pass constitutional muster: a court could be reasonably certain that the
defendant was apprised of the action against her and was allowed the opportunity
to be heard.
Ethical and privacy issues associated with obtaining enough information
from a defendant’s Facebook profile for a court to engage in the Rio Due Process
balancing can be solved by weighing the judicial efficiency aspects of allowing
service via Facebook over ethical considerations in allowing attorneys or their
agents to “friend” foreign defendants. While it may be imprudent to allow the
practice across the board due to the privacy and ethical concerns inherent in
social media and litigation, courts could allow the practice for the sole purpose of
gaining information to serve process and could limit it further by only allowing
the relevant information to be seen in camera by the court before service is sent.
Either approach would narrow the scope of problems arising from the ethical and
privacy concerns laid out earlier, while simultaneously allowing for greater
judicial efficiency in serving defendants abroad, and ultimately tipping the policy
171
considerations towards allowing Facebook for service of process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Continuing the expansion of electronic service of process by allowing
Facebook to be used in limited circumstances is the next step in the evolution of
the jurisprudence. As evidenced by the 2012 initial public offering of

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002).
Shultz, supra note 5.
Sending a Message, supra note 119.
Hedges, supra note 24.
Shultz, supra note 5.
See N.Y.C. Bar Assn. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2010-2, supra note 135.
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Facebook, as well as the one billion active-user milestone, the company
173
continues to cement itself in global culture. As more people around the globe
interact daily with the site, the greater the chances that it can be used to achieve
the central aspects of Due Process: notice and the opportunity to be heard.
While the problems of authenticating and verifying that notice was provided
to the defendant may be unsolvable in certain situations, there are many other
situations in which Facebook could be used—namely, when privacy settings are
limited or non-existent, or when ethical rules do not preclude the use of
“friending” by litigators. In these situations, it makes sense from a position of
judicial economy to allow international litigators another avenue to achieve
service of process abroad and effectively obtain relief for their clients. However,
if service of process via Facebook becomes common practice, one thing may still
remain uncertain: whether you accept that next friend request.

172. Evelyn M. Rusli & Peter Eavis, Facebook Raises $16 Billion in I.P.O., N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/facebook-raises-16-billion-in-i-p-o/.
173. Key Facts, supra note 73.
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